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ABSTRACT
When differential privacy was created more than a decade ago, the
motivating example was statistics published by an official statis-
tics agency. In attempting to transition differential privacy from
the academy to practice, the U.S. Census Bureau has encountered
many challenges unanticipated by differential privacy’s creators.
These challenges include obtaining qualified personnel and a suit-
able computing environment, the difficulty accounting for all uses
of the confidential data, the lack of release mechanisms that align
with the needs of data users, the expectation on the part of data
users that they will have access to micro-data, and the difficulty
in setting the value of the privacy-loss parameter, ϵ (epsilon), and
the lack of tools and trained individuals to verify the correctness
of differential privacy implementations.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Privacy protections; • Theory of
computation → Theory of database privacy and security; •
Software and its engineering→ Software verification;
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1 INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Census Bureau is the largest agency in the Federal Statis-
tical System. According to the Census Bureau’s mission statement,
“The Census Bureau’s mission is to serve as the leading source of
quality data about the nation’s people and economy. We honor pri-
vacy, protect confidentiality, share our expertise globally, and con-
duct our work openly.”[22]
As the 2020 Census approaches, focus turns to the Census Bu-
reau as it deploys differential privacy to protect privacy in the up-
coming decennial census. Invented by Dwork et. al in 2006, differ-
ential privacy provides a mathematical definition for the privacy
loss to individuals associatedwith the publishing of statistics based
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on their confidential data. Today the differential privacy literature
provides numerous mechanisms for privacy preserving data pub-
lishing and privacy preserving data mining while limiting the re-
sulting privacy loss to mathematically provable bounds[11].
The 2020 Census data processing system begins by attempting
to collect data from all people living in the United States through
a variety of means, including an online instrument, a telephone
voice-response system, a form that can be mailed in, and “enumer-
ators” who travel from house-to-house for non-response follow-up
(NRFU)[21]. These confidential datawill collected and processed to
create the Census Unedited File (CUF), which will contain a block-
by-block list of every person in the United States. These data must
be completed in time to meet the statutory deadline for reappor-
tioning the House of Representatives (December 31, 2020). Sub-
ject matter experts working with Census-developed software re-
view the CUF and make corrections based on their expertise and
other data sources. The result is the Census Edited File (CEF). The
DisclosureAvoidance System (DAS), currently under development,
will use a novel differential privacy mechanism to add noise to the
CEF, producing the Microdata Detail File (MDF) that the Census
Bureau’s tabulation system will use to create the traditional data
products.
In 2008, the Census Bureau deployed OnTheMap, the first pro-
duction system to use differential privacy[6]. Six years later, Google
deployed RAPPOR[12], the second major production system to use
differential privacy, in its Chrome web browser. Today, differential
privacy is also being used by Apple[7] and Microsoft[9]. Although
these examples all use differential privacy to protect data supplied
by individuals, they use it in different ways, for different purposes.
The Census Bureau operates as a trusted curator, which collects sen-
sitive data from individuals, performs statistical tabulations, and
publishes them. Trusted curators use differential privacy to pre-
vent matching between a respondent’s identity, their data, and a
specific data release, which is the Census Bureau’s legal require-
ment under Section 9 of the Census Act, U.S. Code Title 13. Google,
Apple andMicrosoft use the local model of differential privacy: ran-
domization is performed by software running on the individual’s
computer. These companies use differential privacy so that they
cannot make reliable inferences about specific users. These compa-
nies use differential privacy to increase public acceptance of their
data collection methods.
In 2017, the Census Bureau announced that it would be using
differential privacy as the privacy protection mechanism for the
2020 Census of Population of Housing[14]. There is no off-the-
shelf mechanism for applying differential privacy to a national cen-
sus. Although in principle, the Census Bureau could applyGoogle’s
RAPPOR mechanism to the raw census returns, any resulting tab-
ulations would contain far too much noise for any sensible value
of ϵ to be of much statistical value. To use the Census Bureau’s ter-
minology, the resulting statistics would likely not meet “fitness for
use” standards, which are also part of the mandate in the Census
Act. The same result would ensue if the Census Bureau employed
the original Laplace Mechanism[10] to protect its publication ta-
bles. An added complication of the Laplace Mechanism is that the
tables would not be internally consistent, which might create con-
cerns for data users. Instead, the Census Bureau revealed that it
was developing, implementing, testing, and deploying a new differ-
ential privacy mechanism. It committed to publishing the mecha-
nism in the peer-reviewed academic literature and making the im-
plementation available to the public, along with suitable test data.
Surprisingly, the Census Bureau’s experience with OnTheMap
did not significantly prepare the organization for the difficulty of
deploying differential privacy for the 2020 Census. OnTheMapwas
a new product that was designed to incorporate modern privacy
protection. In comparison, the decennial Census of Population and
Housing, first performed under the direction of Thomas Jefferson
in 1790, is the oldest and most expensive statistical undertaking of
the U.S. government. Transitioning existing data products to differ-
ential privacy has revealed both today’s limits in the field of formal
privacy, and demonstrated the difficulty of retrofitting legacy sta-
tistical products to conform with modern privacy practice.
2 PRIORWORK
Statistical agencies of the U.S. government have traditionally used
statistical disclosure limitation techniques[13] to protect confiden-
tiality; Lauger et al. details how those techniques were applied to
many data products released by the U.S. Census Bureau[15].
Abowd identifies the challenges faced by statistical agencies in
reconciling their traditional disclosure limitation practices with
themodern realities of database reconstruction[2, 3], which ismade
possible because of the large number of statistics published by of-
ficial statistical agencies, the availability of large scale computa-
tional resources, and third-party data that can improve the accu-
racy of the reconstructed database when used in a re-identification
attack.
Abowd and Schmutte proposes an approach that statistical agen-
cies can use to set ϵ using economic theory[4].
3 SPECIFIC CHALLENGES
Here we present some of the challenges that the Census Bureau
has encountered during the deployment of differential privacy. We
group the challenges into those that arise from current limitations
in the mathematics of differential privacy, those resulting from op-
erational complexities within the Census Bureau, and issues faced
by the agency’s data users.
3.1 Scientific Issues
Differential privacy is less than 15 years old, and most existing
mechanisms were created for computer science applications, not
the needs of official statistical agencies.
Hierarchical Mechanisms. For the 2020 Census, the agency de-
sired a mechanism that controlled the error as statistics were re-
ported from smaller geographies (e.g. blocks and block groups) to
larger geographies (e.g. census tracts and counties) such that the er-
ror would decrease as the population in the relevant geography in-
creased. This required the Census Bureau to develop a set of novel
hierarchical mechanisms designed to optimize the accuracy of mul-
tiple queries simultaneously.
Invariants. For the 2018 End-to-End test, the Census Bureau is
reporting exact counts for some statistics (e.g. the number of peo-
ple living on each block) but privatized counts for other statistics
(e.g. the number of Hispanics living on each block). The agency
has adopted the term invariants to describe statistics that are not
changed by the application of differential privacy, and views them
as restrictions on the universe of neighboring databases. Neverthe-
less, there is no well-developed theory for how differential privacy
operates in the presence of such invariants. In addition, the histori-
cal reasons for having invariants may no longer be consistent with
the Census Bureau’s confidentiality mandate.
Stratified sampling. Between 1940 and 2000, the Census Bureau
used two census forms: a short-form sent to the majority of house-
holds, and a long-form with more questions that was sent to a sub-
set. In 2005 the Bureau replaced the long-form with the American
Community Survey, a project that continuously measures the U.S.
population using a stratified probability sample. Currently, there is
no accepted mechanism for applying differential privacy to the re-
sults of such sampling. This has delayed the introduction of formal
privacy mechanisms for the American Community Survey.
Quality Metrics. While the trade-off between between statisti-
cal accuracy and privacy loss is at the heart of differential pri-
vacy, there are many metrics for assessing the quality of a pub-
lished dataset. One approach is to calculate the L1 error between
the true data (i.e. without disclosure limitation) and the privatized
data. This is a coarse measure: a disclosure limited product with
a high L1 compared to the same product without disclosure limi-
tation may still be very accurate for its intended use. Ideally, if in-
tended uses are known, they can be incorporated into the privacy
mechanism so that the usefulness is higher for the same privacy-
loss budget, allowing the overall privacy-loss budget to be better
deployed.
Presenting and Resolving Equity Issues. Because the Census Bu-
reau intends to publish many tables drawn from the same confi-
dential database and controlled by an overall privacy-loss budget,
there is an opportunity to make some tables more accurate at the
cost of making other tables less accurate. These can be thought
of as issues of fairness between different consumers of the Cen-
sus data, which can be described as an equity issue. In principle,
these issues are no different from the decisions that statistical agen-
cies routinely make about allocating a fixed dollar sampling bud-
get among sub-populations in order to obtain estimates that are fit
for use on those sub-populations. Differential privacy lacks a well-
developed theory for measuring the relative impact of added noise
on the utility of different data products, tuning equity trade-offs,
and presenting the impact of such decisions.
Establishing a Value of Epsilon. Before the arrival of differential
privacy at the Census Bureau, disclosure avoidance had aspects of
the black arts. Knowledge of the actual disclosure avoidance tech-
niques and parameters was restricted to a small group of special-
ists, and the remainder of the agency treated disclosure avoidance
as a black box that input dangerous data and output clean, safe data.
The proponents of differential privacy, in contrast, have always
maintained that the setting of ϵ is a policy question, not a techni-
cal one. When the Census Bureau announced that it was adopting
differential privacy, it also stated that the value of ϵ would be set
by policymakers, not technologists. But how should policymakers
do that? Here, the literature of differential privacy is very sparse.
To date, the Census Bureau’s Data Stewardship Executive Policy
committee (DSEP) has set the values of ϵ for one data product. The
value was set by having the practitioner prepare a set of graphs
that showed the trade-off between privacy loss (ϵ) and accuracy.
The group then picked a value of ϵ that allowed for sufficient ac-
curacy, then tripled it, so that the the researchers would be able
to make several additional releases with the same data set without
having to return to DSEP to get additional privacy-loss budget. The
value of ϵ that was given out was far higher than those envisioned
by the creators of differential privacy. (In their contemporaneous
writings, differential privacy’s creators clearly imply that they ex-
pected values of ϵ that were “much less than one.”[17]).
Mechanism Development.More efficient mechanisms and proofs
with tighter bounds are needed to lower amounts of noise for the
same level of privacy loss, and to make efficient use of the privacy-
loss budget for iterative releases of edited and corrected statistics.
3.2 Operational Issues
Obtaining Qualified Personnel and Tools. An early problem faced
by the Census Bureau was not technical, but operational: it lacked
subject matter experts skilled in the theory and practice of differ-
ential privacy. In part, this is because only a smattering of univer-
sities cover the topic of differential privacy in an instructional set-
ting, and then typically only in a single upper-level computer sci-
ence course. The Census Bureau, in contrast, typically hires grad-
uates with degrees in mathematics, statistics or economics for its
“mathematical statistician” career tract. And while there is a now
a textbook that covers the theory of differential privacy[11], read-
ing a textbook does not provide the necessary expertise to develop
correct differential privacy algorithms and implementations. The
sparsity of expertise was noted by the Bipartisan Commission on
Evidence-based Policymaking, which strongly recommended the
adoption of privacy-enhancing data analysis tools while recogniz-
ing that there was a dearth of existing tools [5].
Likewise, there is a profound lack of toolkits for performing dif-
ferential privacy calculations and for verifying the correctness of
specific implementations. It is now 12 years since the invention of
differential privacy: the situation is analogous to the state of Pub-
lic Key Cryptography in 1989. This has impacted both high-profile
projects such as the 2020 Census, as well as the day-to-day work
involved in producing more than 100 regular data products and
supporting hundreds of researchers in the Federal Statistical Re-
search Data Centers.
Recasting high-sensitivity queries. The 2010 Census publications
included statistics about individuals, statistics about households,
and statistics reflecting the interaction of the two. The sensitiv-
ity of most counting queries is 1—for example, a statistic that re-
ports the number of males and females on a block, or the num-
ber of households. Some queries that combine these kinds of sta-
tistics also have a sensitivity of 1, such as the number of house-
holds headed by a female. But some queries have a much higher
sensitivity. For example, a query asking the number of children
in households headed by a female has a sensitivity equal to the
largest permissible household size. An added complication is that
this value needs to be specified in advance, as part of the overall
design of the survey, rather than derived by looking at the data,
lest information about the presence of a specific large family in
the survey data be revealed.
Currently, the DAS team is working with data users to redesign
the publication tables, with the hope of lowering their sensitivity.
For example, instead of reporting the number of children that are
in a household headed by a person who is Hispanic, the Census
could report the number of Hispanic children. It could also protect
the original query, but at more aggregated levels of geography.
Structural Zeros. Bringing differential privacy to the 2020 Cen-
sus required in-depth discussions of the difference between struc-
tural zeros and sampling zeros[8]. Structural zeros are those en-
forced by the Census Bureau’s edit rules (“there can be no six-
year oldmothers with 30-year-old children”), while sampling zeros
emerge from the data collection effort (“no women over 65 were
found living in this facility”). Injected statistical noise can make
sampling zeros positive (2 women over 65 are reported living in
the facility), but cannot be allowed to undo the edit rules.
In practice, the distinction between structural and sampling ze-
ros in an operational context is far less clear. For example, is the
number of females in a male prison zero because there are none
living there (a sampling zero), or because they are prohibited from
living there (a structural zero)? For that matter, how should the
Census determine that a facility is single-sex? Previously, whether
or not a group quarters was a single-sex might have been deter-
mined by looking at the data; this is not permissible in a system
that implements differential privacy.
Obtaining a Suitable Computing Environment. The algorithms
being developed for the 2020Census require significant post-processing
following the application of noise. In order to characterize their be-
havior, Census Bureau researchers will perform many runs on the
algorithms with historical data, requiring at least three orders of
magnitude greater computing resources than were needed for the
2010 Census. Although the Bureau is migrating from on-premise
computing to a cloud-based environment, this migration was de-
layed because of security concerns, resulting in substantial delays
in the development of the 2020 DAS.
Accounting for All Uses of Confidential Data. A key feature of
the previous disclosure avoidance mechanism was that it did not
change the values of many tabulations at high levels of geogra-
phy. Thus, many reports from the 2000 and 2010 Censuses could
be produced using the confidential data and without applying fur-
ther disclosure avoidance.
A fundamental requirement of differential privacy is that all cal-
culations involving private datamust have noise added before they
can be made public. As a result, the Census Bureau has had to iden-
tify every use of confidential data in the execution and process-
ing of the 2020 Census. New and unanticipated requirements have
emerged during the design of the system after the team thought
that the design was locked down.
Lack of Final Specifications.Beyond those issues arising from the
application of differential privacy, the team building the DAS has
also faced by the fluid nature of the decennial census. Many of the
Census Bureau data products have been traditionally developed
near the end of the decade in consultationwith the data users. This
collaborative process helps ensure the utility of the census data,
but it is at odds with the design and development of a differential
privacy system, which requires that all computations be known in
advance, or that some amount of privacy-loss budget be reserved
for future use.
3.3 Issues Faced by Data Users
Access to Micro-data. Many Census Bureau data users are accus-
tomed to using micro-data, like those originally released for the
1960 Census, that are either raw or that have undergone only lim-
ited confidentiality edits as part of their disclosure avoidance. Un-
fortunately, record-level data are exceedingly difficult to protect
in a way that offers real privacy protection while leaving the data
useful for unspecified analytical purposes. At present, the Census
Bureau advises research users who require such data to consider
restricted-access modalities[1].
Difficulties Arising from Increased Transparency. Most users of
the 2000 and 2010 Censuses were not aware of the details of the dis-
closure avoidance mechanism nor its impact on their results. With
2020 Census data, users will be aware that noise has been added,
and they will be able to calculate the margin of error that the noise
introduces. Some data users are confused about thismargin of error,
a term that they traditionally associate with sample surveys. While
coverage error has long been openly discussed and analyzed,[18]
discussion of the error caused by disclosure avoidance procedures,
historically called “confidentiality edits,” has been terse and limited
to qualitative statements[20].
Misunderstandings about Randomness and Noise Infusion. A key
mechanism of differential privacy is adding random noise to tabu-
lated data before releasing. By design, the noise-injection mecha-
nisms used by the Census Bureau will result in increased accuracy
as population sizes increase. Explaining this to data users, commu-
nity leaders and the general public will be critical to the acceptance
of this new disclosure avoidance methodology.
For example, some statistical programmers want to use repeat-
able random number generators for regression testing and produc-
tion, and have the ability to re-run the privacy mechanism if the
first set of coins produces results that are deemed unacceptable.
Differential privacy is clearly incompatible with this notion.
Although there are many technical papers explaining differen-
tial privacy, including theHarvardUniversity Privacy Tools Project[19]
and the Duke University tutorials[16], their academic language is
not accessible to many of the Census Bureau’s data users. The lack
of simplified materials to promote a general understanding of dif-
ferential privacy increases the likelihood of misunderstanding.
4 RECOMMENDATIONS
Despite the numerous challenges differential privacy adoption faced,
it has taken root in the Census Bureau. Here, we present recom-
mendations for furthering its integration into the Census Bureau
and overcoming some of the hurdles outlined above.
Repeated Discussions with Decision Makers. The deployment of
differential privacy within the Census Bureau marks a sea change
for the way that official statistics are produced and published. But
despite the problems encountered, the Census Bureau has not re-
considered its decision to adoptmodern disclosure avoidancemech-
anisms. We believe that this is a result of the Census Bureau’s long-
standing commitment to confidentiality protections and the adop-
tion of modern methodological techniques. Repeated discussions
with both the Census Bureau’s governing boards and with data
users are vital in assembling and maintaining institutional support
for this transformative effort.
Controlled Vocabulary. The Census Bureau has found it helpful
to establish a controlled vocabulary of terms for discussions ofmat-
ters involving differential privacy. In computing and mathematics,
it is common for practitioners to adopt many different words to
mean the same thing (and, conversely, to use the same words to
mean different things in different contexts). Internal comprehen-
sion as well as the ease of communicating with others has been
helped by having a controlled vocabulary, enforced from the high-
est levels of technical management.
Integrated Communications. The Census Bureau has created a
communications team staffed with senior members of several di-
rectorates for the purpose of working with data users and the pub-
lic on promoting understanding of the new privacy initiative. This
team plays a pillar role in the acceptance of differential privacy,
both internally and externally to the Census Bureau.With a public-
facing educational tutorial forthcoming, and a suite of informative
media in the works, they are making user-level understanding of
differential privacy rapidly more available to non-experts.
Finally, the Census Bureau is expanding its educational efforts
on the topic of differential privacy.
5 CONCLUSION
The Census Bureau is now two years into the process of moderniz-
ing its disclosure avoidance systems to incorporate formal privacy
protection techniques. Although this process has proven to be chal-
lenging across disciplines, it promises to reward the efforts of the
Census Bureau. In order to attempt privacy protection on the same
scale without differential privacy, the Census Bureau could publish
dramatically fewer tables and simply hope that they haven’t leaked
enough information to allow an attacker to perform database re-
construction. By implementing differential privacy, the Census Bu-
reau canmathematically limit the privacy loss associatedwith each
publication. Beyond the 2020 Census, the Census Bureau intends
to use differential privacy or related formal privacy systems to pro-
tect all of its statistical publications.
It is noteworthy that this institution is not only implementing
differential privacy in its statistical analyses, but truly integrating
it into its organizational structure. With staff in communications,
research, statistics, and computer science familiar with and sup-
portive of differential privacy, a set of diverse employees equipped
with privacy tools will be available in the Census Bureau beyond
the 2020 Census. The methods put in place for the 2018 and 2020
implementations will act as templates, greatly easing its adoption
in future statistical projects.With skilled staff and effectivemethod-
ology in place, differential privacy can make lasting improvements
to privacy protection at the federal government’s largest statistical
agency.
DISCLAIMER: This paper is presented with the hope that its con-
tent may be of interest to the general statistical community. The
views in these papers are those of the authors, and do not necessar-
ily represent those of the Census Bureau.
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